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EQUAL, ACCESSIBLE, AFFORDABLE
JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
The first of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
those Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."' As a guide to how
all other rules should be interpreted, Rule 1 signifies that our
courts, and the remedies they provide, must be as available to
an individual as to a Fortune 500 company. If one ignores the
mandate of "just, speedy, and inexpensive" litigation, or treats
it as a cliche, our system of civil justice will not fulfill its fore-
most promise to the American people - that of equal justice
under law.
Speaking at the Cornell Law School in April 1991, I sought
to explore ways in which we can bring to life the majestic ideal
of equal justice under law and its essential component, the
speedy and inexpensive resolution of lawsuits. This article
continues and elaborates on that discussion.
Too often, factors that have no theoretical standing in our
law - factors such as education, race, or limited economic
resources - prevent some Americans from obtaining equal
justice from our legal system. Today, with the increasing
volume of litigation in our courts, assuring equality before the
law - that the process is fair to all who are brought into it - is
a greater challenge than ever, a challenge we must meet.
In recent years, as the costs and delays associated with civil
litigation have increased, the ideal of equal justice has too
frequently gone unfulfilled. When the average American seeks
redress for an injury, the litigation can be tied up for years.
Motions and trial dates are postponed and rescheduled. In the
interim, litigants have, at best, no motivation to conduct effi-
cient discovery and, at worst, incentive to use discovery as an
adversarial tool. Attorney preparation costs increase. Discovery
expenses mount. Excessive discovery eventually prices the
litigation out of reach for those with only modest resources.
t United States Senator; Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee.
'FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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The available evidence confirms what lawyers who litigate in
federal court have long known to be the case: our civil justice
system is neither speedy nor inexpensive. In a survey conduct-
ed by Louis Harris and Associates of more than one thousand
participants in the civil justice system,2 a majority of judges
and lawyers agreed that delay and excessive cost significantly
restrict access to the courts for the ordinary citizen.3
I chaired a hearing on the Civil Justice Reform Act before
the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 6, 1990, and the
following example is typical of the testimony the Committee
heard.' A fifty-six-year-old man was injured by a defective
product, and sought recovery for his medical bills and other
damages. The man badly needed the money for his expenses.
His lawyer told him that once the case was brought to trial, it
would be in court for only two or three days. Four years later,
the plaintiff still had not recovered any compensation. A trial
date was set on three separate occasions and, in each case, was
postponed. In the meantime, the plaintiffs litigation costs,
which reflected these repeated preparations for trial, had
skyrocketed. It is sad but true that the courthouse door is
2 Louis HARRIS AND ASSOC., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CML JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1989) reprinted in The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91-184 (1990). The
survey, conducted for the Foundation for Change, was based on in-depth
telephone interviews with 250 private litigators who represent plaintiffs, 250
private litigators who represent defendants, 100 public interest litigators who
actively pursue cases in federal courts, 300 corporate general counsel of
companies selected from the 5000 largest American corporations, and 147
federal district court judges. Id. at 92.
3 Id., table 4.2, at 16. When asked the question: "Do you feel that the
transaction costs of Federal litigation unreasonably impede the use of the Civil
Justice System for the ordinary citizen, or not?" the following percentages
answered, "yes, unreasonably impedes use:"
* private litigators (defense) 52%
* private litigators (plaintiff) 63%
* public interest litigators 85%
* corporate counsel 69%
* federal judges 56%
Id.
4 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1990) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 101-1097]
(statement of Bill Wagner, Immediate Past President, Association of Trial
Lawyers of America).
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rapidly being slammed shut for the middle class of this country.
Once available to everyone, access to the courts has become an
unaffordable luxury, even for middle-class Americans.
The problems of delay and excessive cost are by no means a
recent phenomenon. Over a decade ago, Justice Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. foresaw the magnitude of the problems we experi-
ence today. Dissenting from the Supreme Court's 1980 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to
discovery, Justice Powell characterized the amendments as
"tinkering" and "inadequate."5 Justice Powell explained:
[A]ll too often, discovery practices enable the party with
greater financial resources to prevail by exhausting the
resources of a weaker opponent. The mere threat of
delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many
actual or prospective litigants. Persons or businesses of
comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and
relinquish just claims simply because they cannot afford
to litigate. Litigation costs have become intolerable, and
they cast a lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of
our legal system.... [T]he discovery Rules will continue
to deny justice to those least able to bear the burdens of
delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court costs.'
As Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I believed
that the legislative challenge presented by the problems of delay
and excessive cost in civil litigation was clear: to formulate
proposals that would effectively bridge the growing distance
between the promise of Rule 1 - "the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action" - and the reality of a system
becoming increasingly inaccessible to the average citizen. The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990' answers this challenge by
establishing a national framework for transforming the ideal of
Rule 1 into the daily practice of every federal court.
5 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 995, 998, 1000
(1980) (Powell, J. dissenting).
6 Id. (footnote omitted); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979)
("[Tihe discovery provisions, like all of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
are subject to the injunction of Rule 1 that they 'be construed to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."') (alteration in
original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
7 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-106, 104
Stat. 5089-5098 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482 (West Supp. 1991)).
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Signed into law on December 1, 1990, the Act implements,
for the first time, a national strategy to attack the problems of
cost and delay in civil litigation. The Act provides a mecha-
nism, supported by the force of law, for maintaining a continu-
ing national review of court procedures, involving the entire
community ofjudges, lawyers, and court users. This mechanism
has already begun to fulfill the promise of speedy and inexpen-
sive civil litigation.
I. THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
A. DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FULFILLING
THE PROMISE OF A JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE
DETERMINATION
The foundation for a national strategy to fulfill the promise
of Rule 1 was provided by a Brookings Institution task force in
a report entitled Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delay in
Civil Litigation.' At my suggestion, the Brookings Institution
had convened the task force to make recommendations for
improving our civil justice system. In January 1990, I intro-
duced legislation containing many of the proposals in the task-
force report.9 In December 1990, the President signed the Civil
Justice Reform Act into law. The enactment of comprehensive
court reform legislation in less than twelve months was unprec-
edented and, many had thought, impossible.
Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act, in large
measure, because of the consensus approach that produced the
legislation. When I convened the Brookings task force at its
first meeting in September 1988, I was struck immediately by
the composition of its membership." It was not simply that
the thirty-six members represented, as one federal judge has re-
marked, the "heavy-weight thinking in every spectrum of our
judicial system,"" - although I wholeheartedly endorse that
assessment. Instead, what commanded my attention was the
8 BROOKCINGS INST. TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND
DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989), [hereinafter BROOKINGS INST. TASK FORCE]
reprinted in S. Hrg. 101-1097, supra note 4, at 421-73.
' S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
10 BROOKINGS INST. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 45-49.
" S. Hrg. 101-1097, supra note 3, at 227 (testimony of Hon. Richard A.
Enslen, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan).
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diversity of views represented. Working together on the task
force were individuals who had long argued over the best
approach to court reform. The membership of the Brookings
task force included leading litigators from the plaintiff and
defense bar, civil and women's rights lawyers, attorneys repre-
senting consumer and environmental organizations, general
counsel of major corporations, representatives of the insurance
industry, law professors, and former judges.
The task force itself stated that: "On many legal and policy
matters, the participants in our task force disagree. However,
on the condition of our civil justice system and on the means of
improving it, the members of our task force find common
ground."'2 To hold that common ground, the task force adopt-
ed a strict consensus approach: each of the thirty-six members
held the authority to veto any proposal.
The recommendations for reform which emerged from this
unlikely consensus ultimately became the Civil Justice Reform
Act. The key structural feature of these recommendations is the
requirement that each of the ninety-four federal district courts
in the country establish a local advisory group to study the
court and to recommend a plan for reducing cost and delay. 3
In communities throughout the nation, these ninety-four adviso-
ry groups are reproducing the valuable consensus building
accomplished by the Brookings task force.
The purpose of each plan developed by an advisory group is
to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits,
monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes."'4
To accomplish this goal, the Act proposes a number of specific
principles for case management and cost and delay reduction
which Congress has adopted, and which each district court must
consider in developing its plan. 5 Each of the principles set
BROOKINGS INsT. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 3.
13 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 478 (West Supp. 1991).
41d. § 471.
"5 See id. § 473(a). The six principles and guidelines for litigation
management and cost and delay reduction identified in section 473 are as
follows: (1) differential treatment of cases according to their complexity, (2)
early and ongoing case management and control by judicial officers, (3)
discovery-case management conferences held by judicial officers in complex or
other appropriate cases, (4) encouragement of cost-effective discovery through
cooperative discovery devices and the voluntary exchange of information, (5)
prohibition of the consideration of discovery motions unless the moving party
1992]
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forth in the Act rests on a common premise: intelligent case
management puts limited judicial resources to their best use
and reduces delay and excessive cost in civil litigation.
In a district court adopting each of the case management
principles recommended by Congress, 6 the court will conduct
civil litigation in the following manner: A judicial officer will
evaluate every civil action at the time of filing or shortly there-
after.' In appropriate cases, a judicial officer may recom-
mend, or a litigant may request that some form of alternative
dispute resolution - summary jury trial, mediation, mini-trial,
or early neutral evaluation - be used to bypass traditional court
procedures.' 8
The judicial officer will pay special attention, early in the
process, to complex litigation and will issue a scheduling order
designed to impose organization on the process and to eliminate
redundant work by lawyers. 9 In all cases, judges will sched-
ule a firm trial date at the earliest possible time so that, with a
few narrow exceptions, the trial will commence within eighteen
months of the filing of the complaint.2 ° Judges will actively
manage cases by limiting and organizing discovery,2' and by
certifies that it attempted a resolution in good faith, and (6) authorization to
refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution. Id. § 473(a)(1)-(6).
16 In ten district courts, this will, in fact, be the case. These "pilot
districts," designated by the Judicial Conference of the United States, are
required by the statute to implement each of the major case management
principles adopted by Congress. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5089,
5097 (1990). The remaining districts retain the discretion to include the
recommended principles in their plans, and it is anticipated that the six case
management principles outlined in 28 U.S.C.A. § 473 (West Supp. 1991) will
be included, in varying degrees, in the plan of every district in the nation.
The role of the pilot districts is explained in more detail in subsection C,
below.
17 See 28 U.S.CA. § 473(a)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1991).
' Id. § 473(a)(6).
'9 Id. § 473(a)(3)(C).
20 Id. § 473(a)(2)(B). This section allows for exceptions to this rule for
complex cases that are incompatible with such a deadline and for courts
burdened by an extremely heavy criminal docket. For a case to be exempted,
a judicial officer must certify that one of these exceptions applies and that the
18-month goal cannot be met.
21 28 U.S.C.A § 473(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1991); see also id. § 473(a)(3)-(5).
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setting deadlines and timeframes for the filing and disposition
of motions.22
Twice a year, the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts will publish reports identifying those cases that have
stalled in court because of the failure to decide a motion
promptly' or to rule on a bench trial.2' The reporting re-
quirement applies to every district in the United States and has
already taken effect. 25 The first of these reports reveals that
approximately one-fifth of the district court judges have twenty
or more motions that have been pending for more than six
months.26  In one case, a judge has 468 motions pending.27
Judge Justin L. Quackenbush, the Chief Judge of the Eastern
District of Washington, wrote to me last year to describe the
early effects of the reporting requirement. In his letter, he
writes:
In this district, we have commenced to circulate
among the judges the statistics which will be furnished
to this district's Advisory Group. We have also furnished
each judge a schedule of his statistics compared to the
national averages, the district averages, and those of
other judges in the district. This procedure has caused
each individual judge to sharpen his focus on case man-
22 Id. § 473(a)(2)(D).
23 Id. § 476(a)(1).
24 Id. § 476(a)(2).
2 In an editorial, the Washington Post welcomed the publication of
statistics on judges' backlogs:
Information on court delay has been compiled for years, but was
always kept secret. In 1990, however, Congress passed legislation
requiring that this information be supplied by each individual federal
judge and made public. The law has had a salutary effect. One
Washington lawyer reports, for example, that three cases that had
been pending for quite some time in three different district courts
were finally resolved the day before the data were due - the implica-
tion being that judges across the country were cleaning up old busi-
ness rather than confessing delay.
Judge Penn's Backlog, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at A22.
' Memorandum from David L. Cook, Chief, Statistics Division, Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts, to the Committee on Court Ad-
ministration and Case Management 1 (Dec. 6, 1991) (on file with author).
One-hundred-and-twenty district judges and 28 magistrate judges had more
than 20 motions pending over six months.
27 Id. at 2.
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agement and on the timeliness of his decision making.
The case termination statistic in our district has shown
a substantial increase.
We all recognize that peer pressure plays an impor-
tant role in our everyday lives, and it likewise is impor-
tant in the judicial setting.2"
The most effective judges in the federal system have success-
fully employed, in various forms, each individual case manage-
ment principle adopted by Congress. The Civil Justice Reform
Act's innovation is to establish a national framework to identify
valuable court procedures, to implement them systematically,
and to inform the more than 600 federal trial judges in America
of their effectiveness in reducing delay and excessive cost.
B. ADVISORY GROUPS: THE ENGINE FOR REFORM
The effectiveness of the Civil Justice Reform Act depends on
the work of the district court advisory groups. The role of the
advisory groups is twofold. First, they create a meaningful
forum for the discussion of cost and delay reduction. Advisory
group members are engaging in a structured yet informal
process that brings together judges, litigants, and lawyers,29
who have rarely, if ever, exchanged views on the shortcomings
in court procedures. From this exchange of diverse views is
emerging the consensus fundamental to successful reform.
Second, these advisory groups ensure that this exchange takes
place locally among those who best know the legal culture of a
given district. Consequently, each district tailors its reform
proposals to the sources of cost and delay unique to that partic-
ular district.3 °
' Letter from Justin L. Quackenbush, Chief United States District Judge
of the Eastern District of Washington, to U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(Apr. 23, 1991) (on file with author).
' The membership of each advisory group must reflect the broad diversity
of the litigants in each district. 28 U.S.C.A. § 478(b) (West Supp. 1991) ("The
advisory group of a district court shall be balanced and include attorneys and
other persons who are representative of major categories of litigants in such
court ...").
o The Brookings Task Force noted: "[T]he wide participation of those who
use and are involved in the court system in each district will not only maxi-
mize the prospects that workable plans will be developed, but will also
stimulate a much- needed dialogue between the bench, the bar, and client
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
At this early stage in the implementation of the Civil Justice
Reform Act, the quality and diversity of participation in adviso-
ry groups is the statute's most notable achievement. Advisory
groups have amply satisfied the statutory requirement that the
groups be "balanced" and "representative of major categories of
litigants in [the] court."'" Law professors are serving as the
reporters for many groups. The attorney members include
plaintiff and defense attorneys, state judges, former federal
judges, corporate counsel, public interest advocates, and law
school deans. Non-lawyers, such as media and business execu-
tives, union leaders, non-profit foundation executives, and state
legislators, are also participating as advisory group members.
As a result of the Civil Justice Reform Act, more than 1700
community leaders nationwide are serving on advisory groups
dedicated to reducing delay and excessive cost in civil litiga-
tion.32
An early example of the type of change made possible by a
national framework for civil justice reform is evident in a report
of the advisory group for the District of Massachusetts. This
group, led by Professor Arthur R. Miller of the Harvard Law
School, studied the district court and acknowledges that:
Of the data made available thus far, one statistical
fact is very illuminating: Of 90 judicial districts in the
United States, the District of Massachusetts ranks 82nd
in median time from filing to disposition of civil cases,
and 88th in filing to disposition of criminal cases. When
these statistics are contrasted with the figures for total
filings, which show that Massachusetts ranks 58th of 90
districts in the number of civil filings and 88th of 90 in
criminal cases filed, it becomes abundantly clear that the
communities about methods for streamlining litigation practice." BROOKINGS
INST. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 12.
31 28 U.S.C.A. § 478(b) (West Supp. 1991).
32 COURT ADMIN. Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PROFILE OF
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUPS (1991). The distinguished
participants in the advisory groups include Professor Leo Levin, formerly
director of the Federal Judicial Center and now on the faculty at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School; Chesterfield Smith, a past president of
the American Bar Association; and Alan Morrison, Director of the Public
Citizen Litigation Group. The advisory groups range in size from 5 to 54
members with most having between 10 and 20 members. Id.
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delay factor is not a function of the undue calendar
congestion in this district....
These numbers suggest that there is much to be
done in this district, that the formation and implementa-
tion of an effective Plan is imperative, and that the
obligation to formulate a Plan should be viewed as an
opportunity and not a burden."3
The response of the District of Massachusetts to the advisory
group's assessment of its civil and criminal dockets has been
exemplary. The expense and delay reduction plan, adopted by
the court on November 18, 1991, contains detailed local rules
that implement the advisory group's recommendations. For
example, Rule 1.02, "Early Assessment of Cases," requires
judges to hold scheduling conferences, with substantial input by
counsel, not later than ninety days after the appearance of a
defendant in the case. 4 Article II of the Massachusetts plan
establishes a number of procedures for streamlining discovery,
including orders directing disclosure of specified documents, and
certification of discovery motions."5 Rule 3.01 directs judicial
officers to "establish a framework for the disposition of motions,
which, at the discretion of the judicial officer, may include
specific deadlines or general time guidelines for filing
motions." 6
C. PILOT AND DEMONSTRATION DISTRICTS:
STANDARDS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
The Civil Justice Reform Act creates two complementary
programs, a pilot program and a demonstration program, that
support the work of the advisory groups throughout the nation.
Together, these programs engage fifteen of the ninety-four
district courts in testing the effectiveness of the case manage-
ment techniques at the core of the Act.
33 CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM COMM., EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN
FOR THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS. 7-8 (Preliminary Draft)
(July 31, 1991).
34 CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM COMM. OF THE U. S. DIST COURT FOR THE DIST.
OF MASS., EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 21 (1991).
" Id. at 34-50.
36 Id. at 50.
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The "pilot program"37 established by the Act directs the
Judicial Conference of the United States to select ten district
courts in which the case management principles set forth in the
statute are mandatory.8 These pilot courts must include, in
the expense and delay reduction plans they adopt, the litigation
management guidelines for cost and delay reduction identified
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a). 9 The difference between these ten
pilot districts and other districts is only one of degree. Districts
not designated as pilot districts must consider the six case
management principles in the Act, but may choose to include
them in a plan for reducing expense and delay at their discre-
tion.4 °
The ten districts participating in the pilot program are
working at an accelerated schedule. The advisory groups for
these districts have recommended plans for reducing expense
and delay, and the courts have begun to implement these plans
through local rules. The pilot district plans will remain in effect
for a minimum of three years.4
The "demonstration program"4 2 established by the Act is, in
one respect, the most ambitious of the statute's programs. The
demonstration program pushes beyond the principles of litiga-
tion management listed in 28 U.S.C.A. § 473 and implements,
on an experimental basis, more aggressive case management
techniques in five district courts.
Three of the demonstration districts, the Northern District
of California, the Northern District of West Virginia, and the
Western District of Missouri, are experimenting "with various
methods of reducing cost and delay in civil litigation, including
37 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105, 104 Stat. 5097 (1990).
" Id. § 105(b)(1). The Judicial Conference selected the following districts
as pilot districts: Southern District of California, District of Delaware,
Northern District of Georgia, Western District of Tennessee, Southern District
of New York, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Western District of Oklahoma,
Southern District of Texas, District of Utah, and Eastern District of Wisconsin.
Civil Justice Reform Pilot Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH, April 1991, at 2.
" Id. § 105(b). See supra note 15, for a list of the six principles for cost
and delay reduction identified in section 473.
40 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a) (West Supp. 1991).
41 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(a)(3), 104 Stat. 5097 (1990).
42 Id. § 104.
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alternative dispute resolution."43 The two remaining demon-
stration districts designated by the Act, the Western District of
Michigan and the Northern District of Ohio, are testing "sys-
tems of differentiated case management that provide specifically
for the assignment of cases to appropriate processing tracks that
operate under distinct and explicit rules, procedures, and
timeframes for the completion of discovery and for trial.""
The differentiated case management plan adopted by the
Western District of Michigan combines implementation of a
case-tracking system with the other case management principles
contained in section 473(a). In its report, the advisory group
describes its comprehensive and integrated approach:
The recommended plan will divide the civil docket of the
district into six tracks defined principally in terms of the
length of time it takes for the case to be resolved and the
degree of judicial involvement in the case management
process. The tracks span a continuum from the least
complex cases, expected to resolve themselves in a rela-
tively short time with little judicial involvement and
sparing use of case management techniques, to the most
complex cases: those expected to take years to resolve,
requiring intensive judicial involvement in the manage-
ment of discovery, the resolution of discovery disputes,
and the selection and use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion processes, as well as in other aspects of case man-
agement. . . . The single most important element in
effective case management, however, is the prudent
exercise of sound judicial discretion in making an early
determination in each case about how long the case
should be permitted to pend, the scope and degree to
which the court will be actively involved in the day-to-
day management of the case, the method of alternative
dispute resolution, if any, that will be employed, the
limitations, if any, that will be placed on the discovery
process, and the extent to which the resources of the
court will assist in resolving the case.45
43 Id. § 104(b)(2).
4 Id. § 104(b)(1).
4CIVIL JUSTICE ADVISORY GROUP TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT OF THE W.
DIST. OF MICH., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT
APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at 130-133 (1991).
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In all six tracks, the advisory committee recommended that the
district should conduct, at a minimum, an initial case manage-
ment conference via telephone by a judicial officer.4" This
conference should take place within two weeks of the defen-
dant's answer or first response to the complaint.'7 During this
conference, the judicial officer will discuss the following issues
with the parties: the assignment of the case to a specific track,
the need for any prediscovery disclosure, jurisdictional or other
dispositive issues, the extent and timeframe of discovery, dead-
lines for filing motions, the referral of appropriate cases to
alternative dispute resolution, and the establishment of early,
firm trial dates.'
D. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
I have heard concern voiced that the plans developed by
advisory groups and district courts may be put on the shelf, so
to speak, and ignored, thereby undermining the Civil Justice
Reform Acts goal of achieving the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of civil actions.
The Act expressly addresses this concern by requiring
national implementation of the plans developed by the advisory
groups and district courts. By December 1, 1993, three years
from the date of enactment, every one of the ninety-four district
courts in the nation must move beyond evaluation of its proce-
dures to the actual implementation of a plan to reduce expense
and delay in civil litigation.49
At the end of 1991, thirty-four district courts had already
adopted plans, choosing to do so far in advance of the December
1993 deadline. 0 More than one-third of all federal district
46 Id. at 134.
47 1d.
48Id. at 134-35.
49 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 5096 (1990).
o The 34 districts that have already implemented plans are as follows: the
District of Alaska, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Eastern District of
California, the Northern District of California, the Southern District of
California, the District of Delaware, the Southern District of Florida, the
Northern District of Georgia, the District of Idaho, the Southern District of
Illinois, the Northern District of Indiana, the Southern District of Indiana, the
District of Kansas, the District of Massachusetts, the Western District of
Michigan, the District of Montana, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern
1992]
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courts now have in place locally-developed plans for reducing
costs and delays in civil litigation, and the remaining districts
will soon follow.
In the thirty-four district courts that have adopted plans,
implementation of the Act is working better than anticipated.
One of the Act's most controversial provisions was its mandate
that district courts consider the six specific case management
techniques adopted by Congress in section 473(a). Nevertheless,
as district courts implement their reform plans, an overwhelm-
ing majority of them are including these six principles in their
programs:
* Recommendation that judges hold "discovery case man-
agement conferences" in order to organize and stream-
line complex litigation.5 All thirty-four district courts
that have adopted civil justice expense and delay-reduc-
tion plans have implemented such a provision.52
Recommendation that cooperative discovery among
litigants be encouraged. 3 This recommendation has
also been adopted by all thirty-four district courts imple-
menting plans.'
Recommendation that courts take advantage of the
authority provided by the Act to expand use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution programs, thus bypassing tradi-
tional court procedures.55 Thirty-two of the thirty-four
District of New York, the Southern District of New York, the Northern
District of Ohio, the Western District of Oklahoma, the District of Oregon, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Western District of Tennessee, the
Eastern District of Texas, the Southern District of Texas, the District of Utah,
the District of the Virgin Islands, the Eastern District of Virginia, the North-
ern District of West Virginia, the Southern District of West Virginia, the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, the Western District of Wisconsin, and the
District of Wyoming.
51 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
52 See supra note 50 for a list of these thirty-four districts.
5 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
' See supra note 50 for these thirty-four courts.
55 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(6) (West Supp. 1991).
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district courts with plans have implemented new alter-
native dispute resolution programs."
* Recommendation that judges provide early and on-going
management and control of each case.57 Twenty-eight
of the thirty-four district courts have adopted such a
provision."
* Recommendation that courts systematically treat com-
plex cases differently from simple cases so that the level
of court involvement in a case is tailored to the case's
specific needs. 9 Twenty-six of the thirty-four district
courts have adopted such a provision.60
* Recommendation that judges refuse to hear discovery
motions unless the parties certify that they have at-
tempted to resolve the dispute. 1 Twenty-three of the
thirty-four district courts have adopted such a certifica-
tion provision.62
Every plan may be reviewed by both a committee composed
of the chief judges of the district courts in a circuit and the chief
judge of the circuit court, as well as the Judicial Conference of
the United States.' Each of these reviewing authorities may
direct the district court to take additional action to reduce cost
and delay.'
In the longer term, a provision in the Act guarantees nation-
al implementation by directing the Judicial Conference to bring
greater uniformity to the plans emerging from the district
courts.6 5
' See Appendix A for a list of the districts implementing this provision.
57 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
See Appendix A for a list of the districts adopting this recommendation.
9 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991). 1
6 See Appendix A for a list of the districts adopting this recommendation.
61 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(5) (West Supp. 1991).
' See Appendix A for a list of districts adopting this recommendation.
6328 U.S.C.A. § 474 (West Supp. 1991).
64 Id.
6 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 5098 (1990).
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The Judicial Conference must recommend whether the case
management principles set forth in the statute should be made
mandatory nationally. If the Judicial Conference recommends
against such national implementation, it will propose an alter-
native program which it deems more effective in reducing delay
and excessive cost.66 Regardless of the Judicial Conference's
determination, proceedings will be initiated under the Rules
Enabling Act6' to make permanent a national plan for assuring
the speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes.
II. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AT WORK:
AN ILLUSTRATION
The Civil Justice Reform Act has established an effective
framework for reform, as illustrated by the example of "cost-
effective discovery," one of the case management principles set
forth in section 473(a). 68 The evolution of this principle reveals
the working relationship among the consensus-building ap-
proach developed by the Brookings task force, the Act's mecha-
nisms for reducing delay and excessive cost, and the national
debate now taking place on the effectiveness of competing case
management approaches.
One method to reduce the delay and costs created by discov-
ery is through cooperative discovery techniques. Several district
courts had already employed this case management principle on
their own initiative, prior to the passage of the Civil Justice
Reform Act.69  Typically, cooperative discovery involves the
automatic exchange of information between adversaries. Parties
know, in advance of the filing of the lawsuit, what information
they are to exchange, as specified by local rule. Production of
the information occurs in the absence of discovery requests so
cost and delay are reduced. The drafting of routine interrogato-
ries and document demands becomes unnecessary.
The challenge of these automatic disclosures is to identify
information or documentation common to most civil cases that
litigants routinely produce after an appropriate request. The
6 Id. § 105(c)(2)(C).
67 28 U.S.C-.A § 2072 (West Supp. 1991).
8 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991).
9 E.g. Northern District of California (Judge Robert Peckham); Southern
District of New York. For a discussion of the cooperative discovery devices
used by these districts before passage of the Act, see infra.
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names of individuals with knowledge of the case, information
about damages, the existence and content of insurance policies,
and the location, custodian and description of relevant docu-
ments all fit this description.70 Early exchange of the targeted
information should speed the litigation by facilitating a realistic
assessment of the case without prejudicing the plaintiff or the
defendant.
A second approach to cost-effective discovery is accomplished
by "staging" discovery. One of the Brookings task force's twelve
recommendations for procedural reform was to "[s]et time
guidelines for the completion of discovery."71 As part of this
recommendation, the task force suggested the "staging" of
discovery.72 Citing Judge Robert F. Peckham's pioneering
work, the task force indicated that discovery could take place in
two stages. The Peckham approach limits the first stage of
discovery to information necessary for the parties to realistically
and intelligently assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
case.73 Only if the case continues will a second stage of "full-
blown" discovery begin.74
The task force also described a form of staged discovery used
by the Southern District of New York in which the parties are
limited to so-called "identification" interrogatories during the
first stage of discovery.7" Identification interrogatories are
requests for information limited to damage estimates, document
descriptions and locations, and the names of those with knowl-
edge of an action's subject matter.76 Additional interrogatories
are permitted by leave of court under this procedure.77
With the introduction of the Civil Justice Reform Act in
January 1990, the goal of cost-effective discovery was translated
into specific statutory language. By the time Congress passed
the Act, the legislation had been further refined and contained
two separate provisions: one recommending that, in complex
7' Several specific approaches are discussed infra.
71 BROOKINGS INsT. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 19.
72 Id. at 20.
73 Id. (referring to Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of
Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985)).
74 Id. (quoting Peckham, supra note 73, at 269).
75 BROOKINGS INST. TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 20.
76 id.
77 Id.
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cases, discovery be phased into two or more stages;78 and a
second provision encouraging "cost-effective discovery through
voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their
attorneys and through the use of cooperative discovery devic-
es."
79
Today, the work of the advisory groups reflects the legisla-
tive intent of Congress and the work of the Brookings task force.
Districts as diverse as the Districts of Montana and Eastern
New York are including automatic disclosure as part of their
plans for reducing civil justice expense and delay.8" Since
neither of these courts was a pilot district, the decision to
implement cooperative discovery devices was voluntary.81
In its expense and delay reduction plan, the District of
Montana adopted a local rule of "Pre-Discovery Disclosure," that
requires automatic disclosure of the factual basis of every claim
or defense advanced, the legal theory on which each claim is
based, the identity of all individuals with discoverable informa-
tion about the claims or defenses, a description of tangible
evidence and relevant documents, a computation of damages
claimed, and the substance of insurance agreements.82 Under
the proposed rule, such disclosure would have to precede other
discovery requests and, in any event, would take place no later
than fifteen days prior to pretrial conference.8
In its expense and delay reduction plan, the Eastern District
of New York adopted a program called "Automatic Required
Disclosure."' During an eighteen-month test period, the par-
ties will be required to disclose each of the items identified in
the Montana Plan, as well as information about expert witness-
es.
8 5
78 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(3)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1991).
79 Id. § 473(a)(4).
1o BOARD OF JUDGES OF THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4-5 (1991) [hereinafter E.D.N.Y. PLAN]; U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MONT., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUC-
TION PLAN 27 (1991) [hereinafter MONTANTA PLAN].
8' See supra note 38 for a list of the ten pilot districts.
82 MONTANA PLAN, supra note 80, at 27 (Rule 200-5(a)(1)).
8 Id.
84 ADVISORY GROUP TO THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y.,
FINAL REPORT TO HONORABLE THOMAS C. PLATT, CHIEF JUDGE 57-62 (1991).
' E.D.N.Y. PLAN, supra note 80, at 4-6.
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Fewer than half of the district court advisory groups have
adopted expense and delay reduction plans and, inevitably,
there will be a broad spectrum of responses to the Congressional
recommendation in favor of cooperative discovery. From these
plans, however, a strong trend toward adoption of this case
management principle appears to be emerging. In fact, all
thirty four of the district courts that have adopted cost and
delay reduction plans have adopted measures to reduce cost and
delay associated with discovery. 6
In addition to those districts voluntarily adopting coopera-
tive discovery devices, each pilot district must implement
cooperative discovery as part of its plan. 7 For example, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania has already adopted a provi-
sion entitled: "Discovery - Duty of Self-Executing
Disclosure."'  The detailed section specifies the timing and
sequence of discovery, the information to be disclosed automati-
cally, and the duty to supplement disclosures if necessary. 9
After three years' time, the Rand Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice will compare the success of this provision with the
experience in comparable courts which may not have adopted
similar cooperative discovery devices. If the early enthusiasm
for this case management principle proves to be justified, the
Judicial Conference will probably recommend to Congress the
expansion of cooperative discovery devices like those in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to those districts that have
declined to implement the procedure.
When the Civil Justice Reform Act was signed into law on
December 1, 1990, Congress intended for the district advisory
groups and the ten pilot districts to continue the reform effort
begun by the Brookings task force. In the year since enactment,
however, an additional and essential contributor has become
engaged in the reform effort more quickly and more significantly
than could have been anticipated - the judiciary and, in particu-
lar, the Judicial Conference of the United States."
8 See Appendix A.
87 Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(b), 104 Stat. 5097 (1990).
18 U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST OF PA., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 13-15 (1991).
89 Id.
' During Congressional consideration of the Civil Justice Reform Act, some
judges were vocal in their criticism of the legislation. Now that the statute
has been enacted, judges are examining it on its merits - rather than
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Led by Chairman Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has embraced
certain case management principles set forth in the Act in its
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.9' A good example of the Advisory Committee's work is in
the area of cooperative discovery. Building on the innovative
ideas and persistent efforts of Judge William Schwarzer, direc-
tor of the Federal Judicial Center, the advisory committee has
proposed amendments to the rules, similar to the local rules
that many district courts have adopted under the Civil Justice
Reform Act. 2 The Committee has even proposed a change to
debating it solely with respect to which branch of government is best posi-
tioned to bring about the needed reforms - and many judges have praised the
legislation. Judge Scott 0. Wright generously described the Act as "one of the
best things that has happened to the federal District Courts." Letter from
Judge Scott 0. Wright, W. Dist. of Mo., to U.S. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
(Apr. 24, 1991) (on file with author).
91 E.g., Several amendments embraced the prohibition against considering
discovery motions without certified attempted resolution, § 473(a)(5). See
proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c), 137 F.R.D. 63, 94-95 ("Upon motion ...
accompanied by a certificate that the movant in good faith has conferred or
attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action . . . ") (new material underlined). See also
proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). Id. at 128-129.
The amendments also authorize referrals to alternative dispute resolution
programs, § 473(a)(6). See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) advisory commit-
tee's note, 137 F.R.D. 63, 87 (the rule was "revised to enhance the court's
powers in utilizing a variety of procedures to facilitate settlement").
Several amendments also include discovery case management conferences,
§ 473(a)(3). See proposed FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(6), 137 F.R.D. 63, 85 (use of
pretrial conferences for "the control and scheduling of discovery, including
orders affecting disclosures and discovery pursuant to Rule 26 and Rules 27
through 37:") (new material underlined). See also proposed FED. R. CIv. P.
16(b)(4) (use of pretrial conference for "modification of the times for disclosures
*.. and of the extent of discovery to be permitted:") (new material underlined).
Id. at 83.
For the complete text of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see 137 F.R.D. 63, 63-155 (1991). For a summary of relevant
proposed rule changes, see id. at 64-73.
' E.g. For the amendments dealing with automatic disclosure, see pro-
posed FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)-(4), 137 F.R.D. 63, 87-91 (additions require the
automatic disclosure, without discovery requests, of certain basic information
needed to make an informed decision about settlement including: identifica-
tion of all persons with pertinent knowledge about the case and sources of
potential documentary evidence, and disclosure of all expert opinions, persons,
and exhibits that may be offered at trial). See also proposed FED. R. Cirv. P.
37(c) (amended to provide sanctions for failure to disclose without substantial
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to further emphasize the
affirmative duty of the court and attorneys to ensure civil
litigation is resolved without undue cost or delay: "These rules
. .. shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." (new
material underlined).,3
The work of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is a
welcome and valuable complement to the reform framework
established by the Act. The Advisory Committee recognizes the
urgency of the civil litigation problem and is amplifying the
message of reform. The interest of the Advisory Committee in
improved case management, combined with the efforts of adviso-
ry group members and district judges working at the local level,
will help recapture the promise of Rule 1 to secure the speedy
and inexpensive determination of all civil actions.
CONCLUSION
The Civil Justice Reform Act set in motion a number of
badly needed changes in court procedures. It has provided a
forum for each district court to identify the causes of delay and
excessive costs in its jurisdiction and to implement the best
tools for reform. Already, those seeking justice from our courts
are feeling the benefits. The advisory group for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania has concluded that the Act is "the most
significant piece of legislation that the Congress has enacted in
the last three decades directed to procedures of the federal
courts for reducing cost and delay in civil litigation."'
justification such as: excluding as substantive evidence material not disclosed,
permitting the opposing party to reveal nondisclosure to the jury, and cross-
referencing to (b)(2) declaring certain facts to be established or preventing
contradictory evidence). Id. at 131.
For amendments relating to staged discovery, see proposed FED. R. CIv.
P. 26(d), 137 F.R.D. 63, 95 ("Except with leave of court or upon agreement of
the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any source before making
[the required automatic disclosures]") (new material underlined). See also
proposed FED. R. CIrv. P. 34 and 36 (amendments require initial automatic
disclosures to be complete before allowing documentary requests and requests
for admissions, respectively). Id. at 125-128.
For other amendments limiting discovery see proposed FED. R. CIrv. P. 31
and 33, 137 F.R.D. 63, 118-125 (amended to limit parties each to 10 deposi-
tions and 15 interrogatories, respectively).
93 137 F.R.D. 63, 74.
94 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE U.S. DisT. COURT FOR THE E.
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Moreover, the consensus approach and the model of reform
embodied in the law advance our understanding of how we can
effectively solve problems. One of our most valuable accom-
plishments is proving that reform is possible in an arena domi-
nated by lawyers and judges who hold deep and often contradic-
tory opinions. Where controversy is inevitable, building consen-
sus is indispensable to reform.
In August 1991, Vice President Quayle unveiled the
Administration's "Civil Justice Reform" proposals.95 Some of
the initiatives - such as increased use of alternative dispute
resolution, the streamlining of discovery and, in general, more
active case management - are already being implemented
across the United States under the Civil Justice Reform Act.9"
The remaining proposals offered by the Vice President - such as
caps on punitive damages and shifting fees to the losing party
in a lawsuit97 - are not so much court reforms as they are sub-
stantive changes in tort law. Rather than improving the fair-
ness of the civil justice process, they would affect the outcomes
of that process. They will, undoubtedly, spark considerable
controversy in Congress, among business people, and within the
judiciary and the bar.
I welcome the additional attention by the Administration to
reducing delay and excessive cost in civil litigation with the
following caveat: the judicial procedures at the heart of court
reform may seem arcane, but the problems of cost and delay
affect the lives of real people. The victim of a defective product
who has already waited five years to be compensated should
wait no longer - neither for his recovery, nor for a reformed civil
justice system. Given the pressing need to reduce delay and
excessive cost, the government must devote itself to achieving
real reform as quickly as possible. As the Civil Justice Reform
DIST. OF PA. 1 (1991) (footnote omitted).
95 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) [hereinafter PREsIDENTs REPORT]. Vice President
Quayle delivered the Administration's proposals in a controversial speech to
the American Bar Association, Administration Unveils Civil Justice Reforms,
THE THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1991, at 8. Some of these proposals were included
in Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).
9 PRESIDENTS REPORT, supra note 95, at 15-27.
97 Id.
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Act demonstrates, meaningful reform requires consensus sup-
port.
The framework for reform established by the Civil Justice
Reform Act is in place and has great potential. It is flexible and
inclusive. The entire community of court users -judges, law-
yers, and clients - now have an opportunity to participate in a
structured plan for improving our civil justice system, and our
entire nation, our economy, and our citizens have a vital stake
in achieving Rule l's promise of speedy and inexpensive civil
litigation.
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